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INTRODUCTION 
The Uintah Basin Medical Center ("UBMC") raises several legal arguments in its 
opposing brief that require response. Most importantly, however, UBMC completely 
ignores the standard for summary judgment. That is, a judge is charged with reviewing 
the evidence presented, construing that evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party, and determining whether reasonable minds could differ as to the 
evidence and inferences drawn therefrom.1 The trial court erred in not construing the 
facts available to it in the light most favorable to Leo W. Hardy M.D. ("Dr. Hardy"). 
UBMC also repeatedly suggests that Dr. Hardy moved to re-open discovery when in fact, 
the Utah Supreme Court, in Uintah Basin Med. Ctr. v. Hardy, 2002 UT 92, Tf 18, 54 P.3d 
1165 ("Uintah Basin 7"), remanded the case back to the trial court instructing the trial 
court to "develop the record." Dr. Hardy presented ample evidence, even without 
developing the record, to create a genuine issue of material fact upon which reasonable 
minds could differ and, therefore, the trial court's grant of summary judgment should be 
reversed. 
The trial court was asked to make a threshold determination of whether the "just 
cause" provision of Dr. Hardy's agreement with UBMC (the "Agreement") created an 
unreasonable time duration. To that end, the trial court was directed to analyze whether a 
reasonable person could interpret the pertinent facts in such a way that made the 
durational element of Dr. Hardy's Agreement (i.e., the occurrence of "just cause") appear 
1
 See Mountain States Tele. & Tele. Co. v. Atkin, Wright & Miles, Chartered, 681 P.2d 
1258, 1261 (Utah 1984). 
reasonable. If there were sufficient facts that might lead a person to find the contract 
reasonable, then the trial court's job was done and it was compelled to deny the motion 
for summary judgment and give the case to the jury. There is no weighing or assessing 
the facts—the facts as presented by Dr. Hardy are accepted as true. If there was no 
possible way that a person could interpret the durational element as reasonable, then the 
trial court was obligated to grant the summary judgment. Here, the trial court's 
assessments of Dr. Hardy's evidence went well beyond the scope of the assignment given 
to the trial court in the context of a summary judgment. In order to survive summary 
judgment, Dr. Hardy "need only present evidence from which a jury might return a 
verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a genuine issue of fact that requires a trial." 
Anderson Liberty Lobby, Inc., Ml U.S. 242, 257 (1986)(emphasis added). Dr. Hardy 
meets and exceeds that standard. 
The trial court misinterpreted the instructions of the Utah Supreme Court and 
mistakenly thought that the appellate court was asking the trial court to do something 
more than just the threshold inquiry that is required in a summary judgment setting. 
UBMC argues that the trial court followed the Supreme Court's mandate. Not only did 
the trial court not follow the Supreme Court's mandate, but it construed crucial evidence 
presented by Dr. Hardy against him in complete contradiction of the well-settled 
summary judgment standard. The trial court's grant of summary judgment should be 
reversed and the case remanded for additional discovery and trial pursuant to the Utah 
Supreme Court's direction in Uintah Basin L 
ARGUMENT 
I. UBMC AND THE TRIAL COURT COMPLETELY IGNORE THE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD AND DISCOUNT THE EVIDENCE 
PROFFERED BY DR. HARDY. 
A. The Trial Court Infringed on the Jury's Duty by Weighing the 
Evidence and Determining Reasonableness of Duration. 
The Supreme Court's instructions on remand to the trial court in Uintah Basin 1 
contemplate mixed questions of law and fact. The trial court has power to make the legal 
determinations, but must, at the summary judgment stage, construe all facts alleged by 
Dr. Hardy as true and determine only whether there are sufficient facts such that 
reasonable minds could differ as to the evidence and inferences drawn therefrom. The 
Supreme Court suggests certain facts that might be useful to the trial court in its 
determination of what facts a jury might consider to determine reasonableness of Dr. 
Hardy's Agreement with UBMC, but does not and cannot take away Dr. Hardy's right to 
have a jury determine the questions of fact in this case. 
For example, the Supreme Court states that "if the 'just cause' provision gives 
successor boards broad discretion to terminate Dr. Hardy [ ], the contract is more likely to 
be of a reasonable duration than if the 'just cause' provision permitted termination only 
for deficient job performance." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at Tf 18. The Supreme Court 
went on to suggest what evidence might be useful in determining the reasonableness of 
duration such as "comparing] Dr. Hardy's contract to the agreements UBMC typically 
enters into with medical professionals." Id, Dr. Hardy provided the trial court with two 
contracts that have similar or identical termination clauses as Dr. Hardy's, and the trial 
court exceeded its authority by classifying Dr. Hardy's Agreement and the other two he 
presented as "unusual" and "dissimilar."2 The trial court was not charged with 
categorizing the contracts UBMC has entered into with its medical professionals, but 
only to view the contracts presented in a light most favorable to Dr. Hardy to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue of fact regarding UBMC's past contract practices with its 
medical professionals. The mere fact that the trial court categorized certain contracts as 
"typical" and others as "atypical" indicates that the trial court engaged in impermissible 
fact finding that is reserved for the jury. 
Even if the trial court did have the power to classify the contracts as "typical" or 
"atypical," the trial court completely ignored the fact that there are two types of doctors 
working at UBMC: (1) doctors with private practices; and (2) hospital-based physicians 
who rely on other doctors for their work. Dr. Hardy is a hospital-based physician and he 
relies on other doctors to send pathology work his way. He does not see patients on his 
own. The distinction between private practice physicians and hospital-based doctors is 
important because none of the contracts UBMC has entered into in the past with its 
hospital-based physicians contain a duration. Thus, contrary to the trial court's 
classification of Dr. Hardy's Agreement as "unusual" or "dissimilar/' the evidence 
clearly indicates that his Agreement is typical for hospital-based physicians. The trial 
court erred by weighing these contracts and making the factual determination that these 
2
 See Addendum "C" attached to Appellant's Brief. The trial court also classified Dr. 
Wayne T. Stewart's ("Dr. Stewart") contract as "atypical." 
3
 Drs. Stewart and Joseph J. Sannella ("Dr. Sannella") are hospital-based physicians. 
contracts and the circumstances surrounding them do not represent contracts UBMC 
"typically enters into with medical professionals." What the trial court should have done 
is accept those contracts proffered by Dr. Hardy and determine whether reasonable minds 
could differ on the issue of whether they are representative of UBMC s past contractual 
practices. 
UBMC contends that the trial court was not "required to determine whether there 
is any possible way—reasonable or not—to support Dr. Hardy's case." Dr. Hardy does 
not expect the trial court to ferret out evidence to support his case which is why he 
marshaled the evidence, expecting the trial court to fulfill its duty to view that evidence in 
the light most favorable to him as the non-moving party. Dr. Hardy is well aware of his 
burden to produce evidence, but he is also aware of the trial court's duty not to exceed its 
authority on summary judgment. Because the trial court exceeded its authority, this 
Court should reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment. 
B. Dr. Hardy Offered Substantial Evidence, Even Without Further 
Development of the Record as Recommended by the Supreme Court 
Sufficient to Create a Genuine Issue of Material Fact Enabling Him to 
Survive Summary Judgment. 
Dr. Hardy's pleadings are replete with facts proving that his Agreement with 
UBMC was reasonable in light of the circumstances of his practice and the rural nature of 
the hospital and community. At the very least, reasonable minds could differ on the 
interpretation of the facts regarding the reasonableness of the Agreement's duration and 
"just cause" issues. The evidence supporting the facts is found in other contracts 
identical to Dr. Hardy's and UBMC's own Bylaws. Further, Dr. Hardy submitted a 
declaration in an effort to develop the record as instructed by the Supreme Court, 
explaining his own interpretation of "just cause" although the scope of the "just cause" 
provision relates to UBMC's understanding of its own rights and powers to terminate a 
physician, not Dr. Hardy's understanding of the term. UBMC wants to pick and choose 
the facts in this case and present its handpicked facts to the trial court for determination. 
The case law is clear: juries determine reasonableness, weigh facts, and make credibility 
determinations. UBMC's prior contracts, its own Bylaws, Dr. Hardy's declaration, and 
the extrinsic evidence presented by Dr. Hardy, are sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact. 
1* Other Contracts Identical to Dr. Hardy's. 
Dr. Hardy provided the trial court with two contracts that are almost identical to 
his own Agreement with respect to the termination language, neither of which includes a 
duration.4 The trial court erred when it made a determination that Dr. Hardy's 
Agreement was unreasonable when compared to contracts UBMC entered into with other 
physicians. The trial court cannot make a determination as to the significance of Drs. 
Sannella's and Stewart's contracts vis a vis Dr. Hardy's Agreement. At this stage, the 
Court should simply have reviewed the contracts presented to it and determined whether 
reasonable minds could differ on the issue of whether three (3) out of the thirteen (13) 
contracts produced by UBMC which are similarly situated to Dr. Hardy's, if not identical, 
are sufficient to be considered contracts UBMC typically enters into with its medical 
4
 Drs. Stewart and Sannella's contracts are attached to Appellant's Brief already on file 
with the Court as Addendums "E" and "G". 
professionals. Significantly, the three contracts presented by Dr. Hardy represent 23% 
of the contracts presented to the trial court. Even on a statistical basis, the contracts 
presented that are identical to Dr. Hardy's Agreement are not atypical. That said, the trial 
court never should have assigned a weight to these contracts or made a determination of 
their typicality as that exercise far exceeded the trial court's authority. 
2. UBMC's own Bylaws Support the Reasonableness of Dr. 
Hardy's Agreement. 
The Supreme Court noted in Uintah Basin 1 that UBMC's Bylaws "suggest that 
UBMC routinely enters into agreements under which the only practical durational limit is 
a liberally-construed 'just cause' provision." Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at \ 18, note 4. 
In its brief, UBMC argues that "this provision of the Bylaws specifically governs 
UBMC's procedures for granting hospital privileges to medical professionals; it is not 
applicable to contracting for services or employment with such professionals." 
Appellee's Br. at 20. This statement flies in the face of UBMC's hiring practices in that 
granting medical privileges to physicians is the basis upon which doctors are employed at 
UBMC. Why would UBMC ever employ a doctor without granting medical privileges? 
Granting privileges and employing doctors are inextricably connected regardless of 
UBMC's attempt to distance itself from its own Bylaws which have a "liberally-
construed 'just cause' provision." The Bylaws are clearly applicable to UBMC's 
contracting practices because they necessarily apply to employment of medical 
5
 UBMC alleges that it has produced all of the contracts in its possession that it has with 
its medical professionals which numbers thirteen contracts. See Brief of Appellee 
(hereinafter "Appellee's Br.") at p. 4 and p. 22, note 11. 
professionals, and they affirm UBMC's history of entering into "agreements under which 
the only practical durational limit is a liberally-construed 'just cause' provision" as noted 
by the Supreme Court.6 This history is relevant in determining the reasonableness of 
duration of Dr. Hardy's contract. 
The trial court ignored the Bylaws, which are evidence of agreements or contracts 
wherein UBMC has utilized a broad "just cause" provision for termination. The Bylaws, 
on their own, are sufficient to raise a genuine issue of fact on which reasonable minds can 
differ regarding UBMC's propensity to include liberally-construed "just cause" 
provisions in its contracts with its medical professionals and, therefore, the trial court's 
grant of summary judgment should be reversed. 
3. Dr. Hardy's Declaration does not Contradict His Deposition 
Testimony. 
Both the trial court and UBMC make much of Dr. Hardy's declaration which 
details his understanding of the meaning of "just cause."7 The trial court erred in making 
a credibility determination at the summary judgment stage. Dr. Hardy's declaration was 
submitted simply to expand on his understanding of the meaning of "just cause" in 
response to the Supreme Court's directive to outline the instances where the contract 
might be terminated, and it in no way contradicts his deposition testimony. Nowhere in 
his declaration does Dr. Hardy attempt to refute or contradict his deposition testimony; 
6
 Dr. Hardy believes that the medical staff portion of the Bylaws are sufficiently 
ambiguous to suggest that they do, in fact, govern employment as well as the grant of 
hospital privileges to medical professionals. 
7
 The trial court's derogatory comments about Dr. Hardy's declaration are telling 
evidence of the trial court's disdain for this case and Dr. Hardy. 
rather he addressed a question that was not asked of him at his deposition, but has been 
asked by the Supreme Court: are there circumstances, other than Dr. Hardy's 
professional performance, that would permit UBMC to terminate Dr. Hardy's 
Agreement? The answer was and still is yes. Interestingly, Dr. Hardy is the only party 
who has responded to the Supreme Court's instruction to develop the record on the intent 
of the parties when they entered into the Agreement. UBMC's response to the Supreme 
Court's directive is to fight additional discovery at every turn. 
Dr. Hardy agrees with UBMC that the language in Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 
(Utah 1983) is very clear. The Court held that "when a party takes a clear position in a 
deposition, that is not modified on cross-examination, he may not thereafter raise an issue 
of fact by his own affidavit which contradicts his deposition..." Id. at 1172-73 
(emphasis added).8 In Webster's Dictionary, "contradict" is defined as " 1 : to assert the 
contrary of: take issue with, 2: to imply the opposite or a denial of."9 Dr. Hardy's 
declaration does not take issue with or imply the opposite of his deposition testimony. 
Dr. Hardy was asked during his deposition what he thought "just cause" meant. He gave 
an honest answer which he stands by today. Contrary to UBMC's allegation that Dr. 
Hardy attempts to "distance himself from the views expressed at his deposition and 
8
 Regarding differences between affidavit and deposition testimony, a Texas Court held 
that "[i]f the differences fall into the category of variations on a theme, consistent in the 
major allegations but with some variances of detail, this is grounds for impeachment, and 
not a vitiation of the later filed document." Cantu v. Peacher, 53 S.W.3d 5, 10 (Tex. 
App. 2001). Further, the Court went on to state that "[m]ost differences between a 
witness's affidavit and deposition are more a matter of degree and details than direct 
contradiction. This reflects human inaccuracy more than fraud." Id. 
9
 WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 284 (9th ed. 1990). 
throughout the course of this litigation" (Appellee's Br. at p. 17), and that he "seeks 
permission to fundamentally change his theory of the case by submitting a contrived, 
post-hoc declaration" (Id. at 3), Dr. Hardy's argument that the scope of the "just cause" 
provision relates to UBMC's understanding of its own rights and powers to terminate a 
physician and not Dr. Hardy's understanding of the term simply tracks the Supreme 
Court's determination that the scope of the "just cause" provision "depends in large part 
on the amount of discretion [the] provision gives to successor boards." Uintah Basin, 
2002 UT 92 at f^ 18, The trial court clearly misapplied Uintah Basin 1 and stated that 
"[gjiven Dr. Hardy's understanding of the intended scope of the just cause clause in light 
of the Utah Supreme Court's opinion, the contract offered little discretion to successor 
boards." (R. 1625). The Utah Supreme Court did not determine that the "just cause" 
provision in Dr. Hardy's Agreement is narrow. In fact, the Court held just the opposite, 
stating that under UBMC's Bylaws, "'just cause' appears to have a broad scope: for 
instance, the board may terminate a member of the medical staff for any reason 
'reasonably related to the delivery of quality patient care.'" Uintah Basin, 2002 UT 92 at 
K 18, note 4. It is clear that it makes no difference what Dr. Hardy understands "just 
cause" to mean. The scope of the clause applies to UBMC's power and/or understanding 
of its power. What is important, is UBMC's Board of Trustees' intent in contracting with 
Dr. Hardy as to those circumstances under which UBMC might terminate Dr. Hardy's 
Agreement, which is something from which UBMC wishes to distance itself knowing full 
well its intent upon Dr. Hardy's hiring. The focus, therefore, should be on UBMC, not 
on what Dr. Hardy thought were instances where he could be terminated. 
Regardless of whether the declaration is relevant, the trial court erred yet again 
when it determined that Dr. Hardy's declaration could not be relied upon. It is not proper 
at the summary judgment stage for the trial court to assess the credibility or reliability of 
Dr. Hardy's declaration as compared to his deposition testimony.10 
4. Dr. Hardy has Presented Sufficient Admissible Extrinsic 
Evidence Proving that there is a Genuine Dispute of Material 
Fact. 
The Supreme Court noted the importance of UBMC's past contractual practices 
with its physicians. This is extrinsic evidence as it does not appear on the face of the 
contract. This and other evidence relevant to the reasonableness determination is 
necessary for a fair interpretation of Dr. Hardy's Agreement. Further, extrinsic evidence 
is used to prove intent as set forth in Ward v. Intermountain Farmers Assoc, 907 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1995). In addition, extrinsic evidence is admissible "if the meaning of the 
contract is ambiguous or uncertain." Id. at 268. The Utah Supreme Court has directed 
that the reasonableness of the duration of Dr. Hardy's Agreement be determined. The 
trier of fact, a jury in this case, must make this determination after hearing evidence 
regarding the parties' intent and deciding whether Drs. Stewart and Sannella's contracts 
are sufficient evidence of the types of contracts UBMC enters into with medical 
professionals. 
See Trujillo v. Utah Dep 't o/Transp., 1999 UT App. 227,142, 986 P.2d 752. 
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DIRECTIVE TO THE TRIAL COURT TO 
DEVELOP THE RECORD CLEARLY CONTEMPLATES CONDUCTING 
ADDITIONAL DISCOVERY. 
UBMC argues in its brief that Dr. Hardy did not properly seek additional 
discovery and that he should have filed an affidavit pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure if he wanted to conduct additional discovery. See Appellee's 
Br. at 21. UBMC ignores the fact that it is the Supreme Court that remanded the case 
directing the trial court to develop the record. That mandate clearly contemplates 
additional discovery. The Court directed a review of other contracts UBMC has entered 
into with other medical professionals. Dr. Stewart was one of the doctors with whom 
UBMC had a contract which did not have a durational limit. When Dr. Hardy attempted 
to question Dr. Stewart about his contract with UBMC during Dr. Stewart's deposition, 
Dr. Stewart's attorney instructed him not to answer. Dr. Hardy intended to continue this 
line of questioning at trial as Dr. Stewart was listed as a witness on both Dr. Hardy and 
UBMC's witness lists.11 Dr. Hardy is vitally interested in finding out why UBMC 
entered into contracts similar to his, without durations, with Drs. Sannella and Stewart. 
Regarding Dr. Stewart's contract, why did UBMC continue to honor a contract devoid of 
a durational limit, like Dr. Stewart's, when the hospital was arguing in this litigation that 
such a contract was unreasonable? 
Further, UBMC refused in the past to provide other UBMC contracts which were 
requested by Dr. Hardy. In fact, UBMC has stated that it has "negotiated a few contracts, 
11
 Dr. Hardy wras not required to re-depose Dr. Stewart. He intended to call Dr. Stewart 
as a witness at trial which he has every right to do. The reason Dr. Hardy does not have 
all of the information he needs from Dr. Stewart is the fault of UBMC, not Dr. Hardy. 
primarily in the 1980's, that had indefinite durations to entice doctors to work at UBMC." 
(R. 1415). This admission confirms that UBMC did, in fact, typically enter into contracts 
with indefinite durations when circumstances called for it. It makes no difference when 
UBMC entered those contracts, only that it did. Similarly, a jury could easily determine 
that it makes no difference how many contracts exist that are devoid of durational limits, 
only that they do, in fact exist. This statement is also evidence of UBMC's intent in 
entering into indefinite duration contracts, supporting Dr. Hardy's contention that 
UBMC's offering him an indefinite duration was a bargaining chip thrown to him to 
persuade him to work for UBMC. 
It is true that discovery has closed and this case has been certified as ready for 
trial, but that was before the Supreme Court held that the types of contracts UBMC has 
entered into in the past are relevant which lead to the Court's direction to the trial court to 
develop the record. Dr. Hardy should be allowed to conduct additional discovery on this 
issue so that he can present evidence to the trial court and "develop the record" as 
directed by the Supreme Court. Further, Dr. Hardy may in fact wish to retain an expert 
witness to testify about "typical" contracts used by rural hospitals. In light of the 
Supreme Court's mandate, re-opening discovery and allowing an additional expert 
witness are not unreasonable requests. Further, this Court should consider what UBMC's 
unwillingness to follow the Supreme Court's directive to develop the record and re-open 
discovery means. UBMC has thwarted Dr. Hardy's attempts at discovery in the past 
when it instructed Dr. Stewart not to answer important questions about his contract. Now 
UBMC is fighting the re-opening of discovery to determine UBMC's past contractual 
practices. UBMC is clearly hiding something and this Court should require a full 
exposition of the facts, especially those requested by the Utah Supreme Court. 
While UBMC's cited case law on this issue is well placed, it is not relevant to this 
matter because in the cases cited, a higher court had not directed further development of 
the record. UBMC argues that when the Supreme Court directed development of the 
record, it simply meant that the parties should submit additional evidence already gained 
through discovery to the trial court. There is no evidence in the Uintah Basin 1 decision 
to support this interpretation of the Court's mandate. 
III. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY AND FAIRNESS DICTATE THAT UBMC 
MUST BE REQUIRED TO HONOR ITS CONTRACTS. 
UBMC states that it determined sometime during the summer of 1996 that it 
needed a fiill-time pathologist. See Appellee's Br. at 7. Interestingly, no one from 
UBMC ever approached Dr. Hardy and asked him if he would be willing to become 
UBMC's full-time pathologist. UBMC terminated Dr. Hardy because it believed that it 
could get a better deal out of Dr. Thomas J. Allred ("Dr. Allred") who also practiced 
emergency medicine. To say that Dr. Hardy was shocked and offended by his dismissal 
after providing excellent service at UBMC is an understatement. Dr. Hardy negotiated 
the "just cause" provision to offset the professional risk and personal sacrifice he made 
by moving to rural Utah to practice medicine. He counted on UBMC keeping its word 
and living up to the Agreement they signed. Now, under the guise of restricting the 
freedom of future boards, UBMC asks this Court to condone its breach of the Agreement. 
This Court should not pardon UBMC's complete lack of respect for a written 
agreement when, by its own admission, UBMC "negotiated a few contracts,..., that had 
indefinite durations to entice doctors to work at UBMC." (R. 1415). This is exactly what 
UBMC did with Dr. Hardy, it signed an agreement with an indefinite duration to entice 
Dr. Hardy to work at UBMC, and now UBMC wants to back out of that Agreement. 
Allowing UBMC to breach this Agreement sends the message that written agreements are 
worthless. 
Finally, the trial court's treatment of Dr. Hardy, which includes derogatory 
statements and a complete abuse of discretion on summary judgment, is evidence that the 
trial court will do anything it can to get rid of this case instead of fulfilling its duty to 
apply the law and give Dr. Hardy his day in court. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court abdicated its duty in the summary judgment proceedings by not 
construing the evidence presented to it in the light most favorable to Dr. Hardy as the 
non-moving party. Both UBMC and the trial court completely ignore the summary 
judgment standard and discount every piece of evidence proffered by Dr. Hardy. Further, 
the trial court infringed on the jury's role in this matter which is to determine whether the 
duration of Dr. Hardy's Agreement is reasonable. Dr Hardy offered substantial evidence, 
such as other contracts identical to Dr. Hardy's, UBMC's own Bylaws, Dr. Hardy's 
declaration, and extrinsic evidence, even without further development of the record as 
directed by the Supreme Court, sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact 
enabling him to survive summary judgment. However, the Supreme Court's directive to 
the trial court to develop the record clearly contemplates conducting additional discovery 
and this Court should re-open discovery. Finally, principles of equity and fairness dictate 
that UBMC must be required to honor this and its other indefinite duration contracts. The 
history of this case shows that the trial court has done everything in its power to rid itself 
of Dr. Hardy and his case, this is not fair. For these and all other foregoing reasons, the 
trial court's grant of summary judgment should be reversed and this case should be 
remanded to the trial court with the directive to re-open discovery if only for the limited 
purpose of determining UBMC's past contractual practices and the typicality of 
outstanding and past contracts with medical professionals. 
DATED this ^ day of May 2004. 
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